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Abstract: Globalization, defined in economic terms as the phenomenon of 
increased integration of the world economy, generates strong reactions due to 
some negative effects of the growth of international trade, the 
internationalization of industrial production, and unrestricted cross-border 
capital flows, while the overall mobility of labor remains quite limited. 
Evidence on the growth of international trade and factor mobility is reviewed 
and analyzed, and problems affecting developed and developing countries are 
detected. Policy measures to alleviate some of the dislocations from increased 
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  ..."[Civilization] is a process....whose purpose 
  is to combine single individuals, and after 
  that families, then races, peoples and nations, 
  into one great unity, the unity of mankind." 
 






  I. Introduction 
 
  Two main kinds of disturbances of the status quo seem to have been 
responsible for the strong reaction globalization has generated in some 
quarters. The first, has to do with the uprooting imposed upon workers and 
localities due to drastic changes in the pattern of production and trade. The 
second, more general in character, has to do with the well known feature of 
market mechanisms that generally do a pretty good job in allocating, via 
prices, resources, while failing to provide any signal to improve economic 
equity. Thus  with the enhanced  reliance on markets to the detriment of 
national regulations implicit in globalization, it is natural to expect an 
increased clamor for considerations of economic equity within and between 
national economies. 
                          
    
1
 Paraphrasing Freud, I had first selected the title: "Globalization and 
its Discontents", but had to give it up after learning that it had already 
been used by others (Sassen, 1998). 
 
  Research assistance by Bianca Vitting and Lorenzo Boratto is gratefully 
acknowledged. E. Colombatto, E. Londero, and attendants at a seminar organized 
by ICER and the Department of Economics and Finance, Torino University, 
provided helpful comments which are greatly appreciated, but they are not 
responsible for the final product. 
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  In preparing this paper, o ne of my guidelines was to try to 
differentiate between the impact of globalization in developed and developing 
countries. Besides my own interest in development economics, this distinction 
is necessary, if for no other reason, because factors determining 
globalization largely originate in developed countries, and while they affect 
other countries, the scope for action, or reaction, particularly by developing 
countries, appears to be quite limited.    
 
  While political, cultural and other kind of considerations are 
necessarily involved in trying to fully grasp the complexity of the 
globalization phenomenon, for reasons both of comparative advantage and space, 
preeminence in this paper is necessarily given to international economic 
phenomena. For our purpose then, globalization is defined as the phenomenon of 
increased integration of the world economy as evidenced by the growth of 
international trade and factor mobility. 
   
  Political economy type of considerations, rather than theoretical 
analysis, characterize its contents which comprises, in section II, evidence 
about globalization pertaining essentially to international trade and 
international finance. Ensuing problems, or "disconnects", are discussed in 
section III. The paper closes with a section of conclusions and possible 
remedies.       
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  II. Evidence 
  
  Depending on their background and interest, people mean different things 
when they talk or write about globalization; particularly, about what is 
becoming globalized, or what could be considered to have become more global, 
now, than before. Moreover, in trying to assess the evidence, different 
concepts, means of measurement, and comparisons can be made
3
. 
   
  When trying to focus on particular indications of the globalization 
phenomenon, several potential categories of evidence come to mind. 1) First, 
evidence about changes in the volume of international trade and the 
internationalization of production. 2) Second, evidence about the expansion in 
factor flows including: capital, labor, and technology. 3) Third, evidence 
reflecting increased access to information, via the internet, cable and 
satellite TV, and other means of communication. 4) Finally, evidence related 
to limitations to national sovereignty, including regulatory, judicial, and 
other powers being increasingly delegated to public international 
organizations, which will only be treated briefly and in passing.  
 
  Below, albeit in summary fashion, evidence on the above mentioned facets 
of globalization is considered, and, measurements, or appropriate indicators, 
are provided whenever possible.  
                          
    
3
 For instance, in assessing the extent of integration of the world 
economy, several authors have compared recent times with the "golden" period 
1870-1914. See, for example, Streeten, 2001 and Williamson, 1998.  
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A. International Trade and Internationalization of Production 
   As a result of successive rounds of tariff reductions within GATT plus 
deep cuts in transport costs due to technical change, export volumes have 
grown at substantial rates during the last century as can be seen from the 
data in Table 1. When measuring trade intensity by the proportion of exports 
(X) to GDP, very significant increases in that ratio have taken place during 
the last decade compared to the changes that took place during prior periods 
of trade liberalization (Table 2 and Figure 1). 
 
Table 1. World Economy. Annual Growth Rate in Export Volume. Selected Periods. 
  1870-1998 
  (percentages) 
 
    1870-1913      1913-1950      1950-1973     1973-1998 
       3.4         0.9         7.9        5.1 
   
  Source: Maddison 2001, Table F.4, p. 362. 
 
 
  Table 2. World Economy. Exports as a % of GDP. Selected Years 
  1870-1998 
 
   1870     1913     1929     1950     1973     1998 
    4.6      7.9      9.0      5.5      10.5     17.2 
 
  Note: Exports and GDP in 1990 prices. 
  Source: Maddison 2001, Table F.5, p. 363 
   
 
  The historic data provided by Maddison shows a substantial expansion in 
exports (thus in international trade), during the period 1950-73 (Table 1) and 
also that in spite of large concomitant increases in output, as measured by  
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GDP, there were significant jumps, from 5.5% in 1950 to 10.5% in 1973 and 17.2 
in 1998, in the proportion of Xs relative to GDP, (Table 2 and Figure 1). 
 
  Table 3, contrasts the results of using the IT/GDP indicator with an 
IT/VA measure for a group of countries. 
 
 Table 3. Average Ratios of Merchandise Trade to GDP and of Merchandise Trade  
  to Value Added. Selected Countries* and Years (1890-1990), percent.  
Indicat.     1890      1913  
  
   1960     1970     1980    1990 
  IT/GDP     13.29     17.02      11.17     12.45     17.02    16.17 
  IT/VA     24.81     32.85     22.66     28.65     42.86    47.65 
 
* Un-weighted average for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
  Source: Based on data from Feenstra, 1998, Table 2. 
  As has been suggested, the above results probably reflect the fact that 
GDP includes agriculture, a sector in which trade has been constrained due to 
protectionist policies in a number of countries, as well as non-tradable goods 
such as services that have considerably increased their share in GDP during 
recent phases of economic growth in industrialized countries. A better 
indicator would then be the ratio of IT divided by a measure of value added 
without services and agriculture
4
. 
                          
    
4
 Feenstra 1998, has proposed using the ratio of IT over value added in 
production.   
  7      



























    
  Feenstra (op. cit.) talks about the "disintegration" of world industrial 
production due to the increased use of subcontracting by multinationals, and 
even domestic firms,  while Streeten (op. cit.) refers to the "integration" of 
world production. Perhaps, a better image, applicable to world scale 
industries, would be that of an "international industrial production function" 
and the changes affecting it. 
 
  First, and probably foremost, would be those changes originating in 
cutting edge innovations and technical progress, to a large extent restricted, 
to the major innovating countries, i.e., the US, Japan and some European 
countries. Then, locational changes in production due to changes in 
comparative advantage as a result of factor changes due to induced  
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accumulation, plus economies of agglomeration (Krugman, 1991).  
 
  We can certainly discern a multitude of new producers in new locations. 
This is particularly true for intermediate industrial products, both 
metallurgical and chemical, whose manufacture is characterized by the need for 
large plants to enjoy economies of scale, as well as access to raw materials 
and efficient transport facilities. Until recently, such intermediate products 
were almost exclusively produced by the most industrially advanced countries, 
but are now being supplied by an array of semi-industrialized countries in 
Europe, Asia and Latin America.  
 
  Table 4, below, presents evidence about this phenomenon, including also 
data for some machinery and transportation equipment. The trend is quite 
clear, even for machinery and transport equipment, among the developed 
countries included, except for Japan, that matches the trend towards increased 
participation of imported intermediates only in transport equipment. 
 
 
  Table 4. Share of Imported to Total Intermediate Inputs. 1974-1993. 
  (percent) 
Cou   Manuf. Indust.  Chemical & all.  Ind. Machinery  Tran. Equipment 
  '74  '93  %in  '74  '93  %in  '74  '93  %in  '74  '93  %in 
Can   16   20   25    9   15   40   18   27   50   29   50  72 
Jap    8    4  -50    5    3  -40    2    2   0    2    3  50 
UK   13   22   69   13   22   69   16   31   94   14   32  57 
US    4    8   100     3    6  100     4   11  175     6   16  167 
 
  Note: Shares were rounded off to integer figures. 
  Source: Feenstra, 1998, Table 5 and author's calculations. 
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  Developing countries may also take advantage of opportunities opened up 
by TNCs in industries lending themselves to the breaking up of the 
manufacturing process into various stages, permitting in this way entry to 
firms with limited technical skills but capable of providing adequate assembly 
labor. Industries such as shoes, clothing, furniture, and some electronic 
assembly, provide perhaps the best examples. See, UNIDO, 2001.  
 
  In its last annual report (p. 30), the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), summarizes these developments as follows:  
 
..."Production processes have become increasingly 
decomposed, vertically as well as horizontally. 
Compared with the past, each process now involves 
a growing number of intermediate stages, which are 
spread across countries and thus contribute to the 
growing trade shares by country". 
  
 
  Table 5 below presents data on imported intermediate inputs for some of 
the labor intensive industries mentioned above. As can be seen, the share of 
imported intermediates increased significantly for all countries, including 
this time also Japan that seems to follow different policies vis a vis 
vertical integration depending on the type of industry. To properly account 
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Table 5. Ratio of Imported to Domestic Intermediate Inputs. Textiles, Apparel 
  and Footwear. Early 1970s to Mid-1980s. 
  (percent). 
   Country    Early 1970s     Mid-1980s    % Increase 
 Canada        41         60       46.3 
 France        15         42      180.0 
 Germany        49*         64       30.6 
 Japan         3          9      200.0 
 UK        19         48      152.6 
 USA         7         13       85.7 
   Average        22.3         39.3     76.3/115.9    
 
  Notes: * Data is for mid/late 1970s. 
In the column of % increase, 76.3 is the average of the averages for the 
two columns to the left, and 115.9 the average of the %   increases in 
the last columns. 




  Other observed changes in the structure of international trade have to 
do with the increasing importance of manufactures in merchandise exports, and 
of so-called high-technology exports as a proportion of manufacturing exports. 
According to World Bank data, manufactures increased its share of total 
merchandise exports from 65% in 1980 to 78% in 1996/97. As for high-technology 
exports, Table 6 summarizes, statistically, information for 50 countries, 28 
developed and 22 developing. The mean (arithmetic) of the country proportions 
are quite similar for both groups of countries: around 1/4 of total exports of 
manufactures are already of high-technology manufactures. As can be seen, the 
difference between the two groups is in the variability of the data rather 
than in its central tendencies, with the developing countries showing a larger 
standard deviation and range.      
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  Table 6. High Technology1/ Exports in Total Exports of Manufactures 
  (%) 
      Statistic   Developed Countries2/   Developing Countries3/ 
   Mean          25.1          24.0 
   Standard Deviation          12.6          19.8 
   Range          7-62          3-71 
 
Notes: 1/Exports of goods from industries that in the USA rank in the 
top 10 according to R&D expenditures; 2/data for 28 selected countries; 
  3/data for 22 selected countries. 
  Source: World Bank, World Development Report. 1998/1999 and 1999/2000,  
  World Development Indicators, Table 19.  
  
 
   
B. Factor Movements 
 
  Free international trade is, at best, only a proxy for free factor 
movements. In a fully integrated international economy, i.e. one with free 
markets for goods and factors, all factors of production would move  freely, 
and the "trend" towards equalization of factor prices foreseen by the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem would be fully realized. Below we comment briefly on the 
international mobility of labor and technology, and with a bit more detail on 
that of capital.  
 
1. Labor 
  While in recent years there has been some improvement in the degree of 
freedom with which capital, and to a lesser extent technology, move 
internationally, labor mobility is arguably lagging way behind.  
 
  Prevailing immigration laws in most highly developed economies generally  
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restrict the quantity and quality of labor flows. Table 7 provides data on 
inflows of foreign workers into OECD countries during the period 1988-1997. As 
can be seen, the total yearly inflows are quite small not reaching even the 
million figure. Countries like Australia, Canada and Switzerland show a trend 
towards declining workers immigration while in Germany, the U.K. and the 
U.S.A. there is an upward trend. 
    Table 7. Inflows of Foreign Workers into Selected OECD Countries.  
1988-1997 
  (thousands) 
  Country      1988       1991      1994      1997 
 Australia1/       34.8       48.4      12.8      19.7 
 Canada      289.22/      233.8     172.9      n.a. 
 France3/       12.7       25.6      18.3      11.0 
 Germany       60.4      241.9     221.2     285.4 
 Italy       n.a.      125.5      99.8     166.3 
 Spain       9.6       81.6      15.6      23.2 
 Switzerland      34.7       46.3      28.6      25.4 
 U.K.4/      10.4       12.9      13.4      18.7   
 U.S.A.5/      58.7       59.5     123.3      90.6 
   Total     510.5      875.5     705.9     817.6   
  Notes: 1/ Permanent settlers; 2/ data for 1989; 3/ permanents; 4/ long  
  term; 5/ permanent settlers. 
  Source: OECD, Trends in International Migration.1999, Paris, Table A.2.1 
 
  The flows data i s complemented with that in Table 8, which provides 
information on stocks of foreigners in the labor force, also for selected OECD 
countries. Among European countries, only in Switzerland, badly in need of 
foreign workers, has the stock of foreign workers reached beyond 10% of the 
labor force. On the other hand, in what were the "areas of new settlement", or 
the "new world", during the last century, the proportions of foreign stock in  
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the labor force remain substantially higher. This is particularly true for 
Australia and Canada, and to a lesser extent for the United States. 
 
  In contrast, the historic record shows that during the period of 
increased international trade under the gold standard (1870-1913), immigration 
was substantially freer and many millions of people crossed the Atlantic in 
search of a better life in areas of more recent settlement. See Table 9 below. 
Moreover, after the wave of labor across the Atlantic, immigrants represented 
very high proportions of the labor force in the "new world" with an un-
weighted average of 49%. 
  Table 8. Stocks of Foreign Labor in Selected OECD Countries. 1988-1997. 
  (thousands and %s) 
Coun.       1988       1991       1994       1997  Av.%  
  1000s     %  1000s     %  1000s     %  1000s     %   
Fran.   1557    6.4   1506    6.0   1594    6.3   1570   6.1  6.2 
Germ.   1911    7.0   2179    7.5   2560    8.9   2522   n.a.  7.8 
Ital.   n.a.   n.a.    285    1.3    307    1.5   n.a.   n.a.  1.4 
Spai.     58    0.4    171    1.1    122    0.8    176   1.1  0.85 
Swed.    220    4.9    241    5.3    213    5.0    220   5.2  5.1 
Swit.    608   16.7    702   17.8    740   18.9    693  17.5   17.7 
UK    871    3.4    828    3.0    847    3.4    949   3.6  3.35 
Euro.   5225     5912     6383     6130     
Aust.   n.a.   n.a.   2182   25.7   n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   n.a.  25.7 
Cana.       2681   18.5          18.5 
USA      11565    9.4           9.4 
Sett.      16428             
   
Notes: For Australia, Canada and the United States, the data is for 
stocks of foreign-born labor force. 
  The United States data is for 1990. 
  Source: OECD, op. cit. in Table 7, plus author's calculations.  
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  Besides assessing the size (quantity) of recent movements of labor as 
compared to prior liberalization periods, differences in the impact of labor 
flows upon developed and developing countries need to be mentioned. For 
example, in the US, there have been recent proposals to impose conditions on 
the quality of immigration. Large inflows of unskilled labor are feared 
because they may lead to further deterioration in wages paid to local 
unskilled workers. These are already deemed to have been negatively affected 
by skill-biased technical change plus increased imports of labor intensive 
goods. 
 
Table 9. Impact of Labor Migration from 1870 to 1910 on Local labor Force 
  in 1910. Selected Countries and Regions 
          Country/ Region   Migration Impact on Labor Force (%) 
  Great Britain               - 11 
  Ireland               - 45 
  Italy                - 39 
  Scandinavia*               - 19 
  Europe               - 13 
  Argentina                 86 
  Australia                 42 
  Canada                 44 
  United States                 24 
  New World                 49 
  * Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
  Source: Williamson, 1998, Table 1. 
  The issue has both theoretical and empirical underpinnings. According to 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theory, free mobility of labor would have the 
same effect (of depressing wages of the less abundant factor) that was  
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foreseen by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Empirically, while US data tends to 
confirm a deterioration in real wages for unskilled labor during the last 25 
years, it is hard to disentangle the main culprit among the effects of 
skilled-biased technical change, increased imports of labor intensive 
products, and immigration biased towards unskilled labor. 
 
  On the other hand, US high-tech businesses are pressing the government 
to increase immigration allowances for skilled immigrants, particularly in 
such fields as computer-science, telecommunications, and biotechnology. Thus a 
new version of the so-called brain-drain from the developing countries that 





  In most accounts, capital movements loom as the single most important 
factor defining the present phase of globalization. Large capital movements 
across boundaries had previously been almost totally restricted to advanced 
economies. The "opening" up of the capital accounts in a number of developing 
and transition economies which took place during the last two decades as part 
of economic liberalization policies predicated by the IMF and the World Bank, 
has led to relatively large capital flows also to these countries
6
. 
                          
    
5
 Engineers and scientists from China and India seem to be in 
particularly high demand in the US. In fields such as computer software, 
subcontracting the work in countries such as Chile or India provides a trade 
alternative to the factor flow, with similar, but not all, the effects 
associated to it. 
    
6
 Liberalization of the capital account meant not only allowing free exit 
and entry of foreign capital, but also providing assurances of free foreign 
exchange convertibility of remittances similar to those agreed upon when 
liberalizing trade transactions.  
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  Capital flows may take various forms, and be long or short term in their 
duration. The most important flows are: direct foreign investment (FDI), 
portfolio investment, and bank loans. Tables 10-13 provide the general picture 
as to recent total capital flows as well as the main discernible trends by 
components and destinations.  
   
  Table 10. Total Capital Flows by Regions and Country Groupings. 1978-1995 
        (billions of US dollars) 
Item/Reg       1978-1981       1982-1989      1990-1995 
   Value      %   Value      %   Value     % 
 Total    442     100.0    578    100.0     1050   100.0 
Ind.Coun    374     84.6    554     95.8     915    87.1 
Dev.Coun     68     15.4     24      4.2     135    12.9 
  L.A.      38      8.5     -5     -0.9      47     4.5 
  E.Asia     16      3.6     17      2.9      69     6.6 
              
  Note: Values are the yearly averages for the period. 
  Source: Bosworth and Collins, 1999, Table A2, and author's calculations. 
             
     
  The above data shows:  
 
  a. While yearly average nominal flows of all types of capital increased 
between 1978-81 and 1990-95 from 442 billion dollars to 1,050 billion dollars, 
i.e. by 137%, the share of the industrialized countries in these flows was, at 
least, 85% of the total during the three periods.
7
 
           
                          
    
7
 Note that the periods selected are of dissimilar duration. The first 
one, starting five years after the first oil price shock of 1973, includes 
1979,  year of the second shock, and covers only three years; the second 
period covers seven years during the external debt crisis, and the last one 
covers five years.  
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  b. During the years of the external debt crisis, the share of the 
developing countries fell to its lowest value, 4.2%, and the countries in 
Latin America, those more affected by the crisis, experienced negative flows. 
 
  c. During the last, and most recent period, the share of developing 
countries recovered, but without reaching the level of the first period. Put 
in another way, while the flows to industrialized countries increased between 
periods by 145%, those to developing countries only rose by 98.5%. 
 
  d. The more developed among them, i.e. those in Latin America and East 
Asia, received the bulk of the capital flows to the developing countries.   
  Next, Tables 11-13 show the changes that took place in value and 
destination for each of the capital flow components, i.e., FDI, portfolio 
investment and loans. 
             
  Table 11. FDI Flows by Regions and Country Groupings. 1978-1995 
  (billions of US dollars)  
Item/Reg        1978-1981       1982-1989      1990-1995 
    Value      %    Value      %    Value      % 
Total      47    100.0      92    100.0     205    100.0 
Ind.coun      38     80.9      79     85.9     151      73.7 
Dev.coun       9     19.1      13     14.1       54     26.3 
  L.A.       6     12.8       6      6.5      18      8.7 
  E.Asia       2      4.2       5      5.4      31     15.1 
           
  Note: Values are the yearly averages for the period. 
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  From the data in Table 11 we see that: 
  a. Between the beginning and the end of the period analyzed, the nominal 
total value of FDI increased almost five-fold, from an yearly average of 42 
billions to 205 billions, i.e. by 336%. 
 
  b. The share of industrialized countries fell from about 81% of the 
total to about 74%, with a corresponding gain for developing countries whose 
share increased from around 19% to 26%. 
 
  c. The bulk (about 90%) of the flow of FDI to developing countries was 
absorbed by countries in Latin America and East Asia, i.e. the relatively more 
developed among the developing countries. 
 
  d. There was a clear reversal between the Latin American countries and 
those in East Asia during the period examined. While initially countries in 
Latin America absorbed 2/3 of the FDI flow to developing countries,  towards 
the end of the period, the share of Latin America had been reduced to 1/3 of 
the total flow to developing countries. Put in another way, while the flow of 
FDI to Latin America increased three-fold in the period covered, that to East 
Asia increased 15 times. 
 
  Table 12, below, shows similarly arranged data for the flows of 
portfolio investment. The key observations are: 
  
  a. The average yearly nominal inflow of portfolio investment increased 
by 1,075%, i.e. more than ten-fold, in the period covered.  
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  b. While still highly concentrated in industrialized countries, those 
countries have seen their share reduced from 95% of the total at the beginning 
of the period, to 89% at the end. 
 
  c. While the flows of portfolio investment to developing countries where 
of minimal proportion during the first two periods, they increased some 25 
times towards the end, with the bulk going to Latin American countries. Those 
countries took in three times as much portfolio investment per year, on the 
average, than countries in East Asia.  
   
Table 12. Portfolio Investment Flows by Regions and Country Groupings. 1978-
1995 
  (billions of US dollars) 
Item/Reg       1978-1981       1982-1989      1990-1995 
    Value      %    Value      %    Value     % 
Total      40    100.0     168    100.0     470    100.0 
Ind.Coun      38     95.0     166     98.8     418     88.9 
Dev.Coun       2      5.0       2      0.1      52     11.1 
  L.A.       2      5.0       0      0.0      36      7.6 
  E.Asia       1      2.5       2      0.1      12      2.5 
  Note: Values are the yearly averages for the period 
  Source: See Table 10. 
 
 
   
  In Table 13, below, we examine similarly arranged data for the yearly 
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  Table 13. Loans Flows by Regions and Country Groupings. 1978-1995 
  (billions of US dollars) 
Item/Reg       1978-1981       1982-1989      1990-1995 
    Value      %    Value      %    Value     % 
Total     355    100.0     318    100.0     375   100.0 
Ind.Coun     299     84.2     309     97.2      345    92.0 
Dev.Coun      56     15.8       9      2.8      29     7.7 
  L.A.      31      8.7     -11     -3.4      -7    -1.9 
  E.Asia      13      3.7      11      3.4      26     6.9 
  Note: Values are the yearly averages for the period. 
  Source: See Table 10.  
  The data in Table 13 indicates: 
  a. There has been minimal (5.6%) nominal growth in the yearly flows of 
loans during the period analyzed. In fact, a reduction in the yearly flows in 
this category when measured in real terms. 
 
  b. The industrialized countries absorbed the vast majority of such 
funds, and their share increased from 84% of the total at the beginning of the 
period, to 92% at the end. 
 
  c. Latin American countries received more than half of loan amounts 
destined to developing countries during the first period, but a shift to 
negative values, (i.e.  outflows), took place during the next two periods, 
corresponding to the external debt crisis and its aftermath. On the other 
hand, East Asian countries doubled their yearly average inflow amount, and 
almost doubled their share of these funds. 
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Table 14 below provides a summary picture of the value and composition of the 





  Table 14. Value and Share of Different Type of Capital Flows.1978-1995 
  (billions of US dollars) 
 Item       1978-1981       1982-1989      1990-1995 
    Value      %    Value      %    Value      % 
Total     442    100.0     578    100.0    1,050    100.0 
 FDI      47     10.6      92     15.9      205     19.5 
 Portf.      40      9.0     168     29.1      470     44.8 
 Loans     355     80.3     318     55.0      375     35.7 
  Note: Values are the yearly averages for the period. 
  Source: See Table 10.  
 
  As shown in Table 14 and Figure 2, the headlines for the story of 
capital flows during the period covered are: 
  a) total flows increased by 137 %, i.e. some 2.4 times; 
b) FDI increased its value almost five times and doubled its share in 
the total; 
  c) portfolio investment increased its value more than 10 times and its 
  share five times, and, 
d) loans increased in nominal value 5%, while its share shrunk from 4/5 
of the total capital flow to a little over 1/3 of the total. 
 
   
 
  






















  Although we are witnessing an unprecedented expansion in the flow of 
information across borders, paradoxically, as far as "technology" n arrowly 
defined, i.e. the technical information required for industrial production, 
there do not seem to have been any major changes directly affecting 
manufacturing processes in a significant way. 
 
  We mentioned above changes in the extent of vertical and horizontal 
integration which have altered production functions in a number of industries. 
There have also been changes in industrial management emphasizing quality (as 
for example the use of quality circles and G.E.'s six-omega quality drive),  
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lower inventories (as exemplified by "just in time delivery"), and increased 
worker participation in plant decision-making (in the so-called "japanese 




  There have been, to be sure, important changes in the technology of 
processing  information that have affected most economic activities. In 
industrial production, mention could be made, of the use of the computer for 
planning production and inventories in an integrated fashion, in controlling 
machines (numerical control), and in robotics, as well as in facilitating 
product and project design (computer assisted design, CAD).    
 
  It is generally claimed that technical progress in transportation and 
communications have had the greatest impact in globalization so far. Fax 
machines, cellular phones, satellite TV, and electronic computers plus the 
internet, have been the major innovations in the field of communications. Cost 
reductions in transportation have facilitated the spread of international 
trade, and those in communication the flow of all types of information linking 
the world together as never before. Financial transactions and political 
awareness have probably benefited the most.  
 
  Table 15, below shows data about the decline in the cost of transport 
and communications. 
                          
    
8
 It should be noted that the origin of some of these improved industrial 
management practices goes back quite a bit in time before present 
globalization. Statistical quality control was developed as part of the US war 
effort during World War II,  and in fact later exported to Japan by US 
consultants, and "just in time delivery" was pioneered by the US automobile 
industry decades ago.    




   Table 15. Decline in the Cost of Transport and Communications. 1930-1990 
  (1990 US dollars) 
 Year   Sea Freight   Air Transport  Telephone call    Computers 
   Cost    %   Cost    %   Cost     %   Cost    % 
 1930     60     0.68      245      ---   --- 
 1940     63     5   0.46    32    189     23   ---   --- 
 1950     34    46   0.30    35     53     72   ---   --- 
 1960     27    20   0.24    20     46     13   12500   
 1970     27     0   0.16    33     32     30    1947    84 
 1980     24    11   0.10    37      5     84     362    81 
 1990     29    -21   0.11   -10       3     40     100    72 
%Decl.        51.7        83.8        98.8        99.2 
                         
  Notes: Sea Freight: Average ocean freight and port charges per ton. 
  Air Transport: Average revenue per passenger mile. 
  Telephone call: For a three minutes New York to London call. 
  Computers: Index based on 1990=100. 
  Source:UNDP, 1999, Box Table 1.1 (based on IMF data), plus author's  
  calculations.  
 
 
  As can be seen, in sea freight, most of the decline in costs took place 
before the present wave of globalization, and can be dated as a post World War 
II phenomenon, with costs declining by 46% between 1940 and 1950. In fact, 
from 1980 to 1990, a negative decline, i.e. an increase in costs, of 21% took 
place. While air transport costs have been declining steadily, the reduction 
in costs was arrested in 1990, showing in fact a 10% cost increase for that 
year.  
 
  Undoubtedly, the most dramatic declines have been in communications, 
with telephony showing sharp declines after World War II and in the period  
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1970-80. Computers, which are of course the latest innovation, and the one, 
coupled with the recent diffusion of the internet, perhaps better identified 
with globalization, show dramatic declines in their cost, from the beginning, 
and in the period 1980-90 which saw the diffusion of the personal computer.  
   
  In spite of all the recent technical progress in computers and 
communications, measures of labor productivity, such as GDP per hour worked, 
do not show significant improvement when compared to other periods in economic 
history.  
 
    Table 16. Rate of Growth of GDP per Hour Worked, 1870-1998 
  (annual average compound growth rates, %) 
 Country   1870-1913   1913-1950   1950-1973   1973-1990   1990-1998 
 W.Europe*      1.55      1.56      4.77      2.35     2.16 
 USA      1.92      2.48      2.77      1.41     1.74 
 Japan      1.99      1.80      7.74      2.97     2.13 
 
  Note: *Weighted average of 12 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
  Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,  
  Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 
  Source: Maddison, 2001, Table E-8, p.352. 
 
 
  Table 16 and Figure 3 compare this record for the USA, Western Europe 
and Japan. Clearly, the peek in productivity for all three was attained during 
the period 1950-1973, i.e. following the end of Second World War and up to the 
first oil price shock. This was undoubtedly a time of intense reconstruction 
in both Europe and Japan which favored the introduction of innovations. Also 
to be mentioned was the stimulus provided by trade liberalization during the 
1960s.  
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  In the more recent period 1973-1998, annual rates of productivity growth 
in Western Europe while remaining higher than before 1950, fall to about half 
their peek values. For the United States, the decline is similar, and, 
moreover, the country does not attain again rates of productivity growth as 
high as those reached during 1870-1950.  
 
























































  The decline from the peek is even more dramatic for  Japan, but, 
similarly to Western Europe, this country has kept for the period 1973-1998 
annual rates of productivity growth above those observed during 1870-1950. 
 
  Macroeconomic instability due to the business cycle plus external shocks  
  27      
seem to have overtaken the possible benefits of technical progress cum  
globalization. However, detailed explanation(s) for these somewhat paradoxical 
results will require further research.  
  Globalization, has also been characterized by institutional changes in 
the rules of the game affecting the use of technology. The birth of the WTO in 
1994, as successor to the GATT, saw the adoption of world-wide intellectual 
property regulations tied to trade access negotiations. These were initially 
pursued by the industrialized countries, specially the United States, to stop 
the sale of counterfeit copies of copy-righted and trade-marked goods, but 
have also had an important effect in the access to patented knowledge.   
 
  The regulation by the WTO of trade related intellectual property issues 
(TRIPS), with its emphasis on faithful adherence to patent laws and other 
intellectual property restrictions, makes it much less likely that 
industrializing countries could repeat the experience of technology absorption 




  Until r ecently, India and other countries, had intellectual property 
regulations permitting the patenting of certain new products but not of the 
processes for their manufacture. This permitted local innovators to try to 
find alternative ways to manufacture patented chemical or pharmaceutical 
products. This is now not permitted by the TRIPs within WTO, and may lead, for 
                          
    
9
 Potential innovators in these countries could use "reverse engineering" 
for understanding how things worked with a view to create alternatives, to 
adapt a product or process to local conditions, or to improve it. See Teitel, 
1981 and 1984, for an overview of the Latin American experience with 
technology acquisition and development, and Lall, 1996, and 2000, for the East 
Asian case.    
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example, not only to higher health costs due to price differences between 
patented and generic products, but also serve as a strong deterrent to local 
innovation in this field. 
 
  In the case of some drugs, large differences in prices between India and 
Pakistan have been observed, with prices in the latter country, which permits 
the patenting of processes, between 3 and 13 times higher than for the same 
product in India, which does not allow such patents (UNDP, 1999).    
 
  The high cost of patented drugs used to treat AIDS has brought out the 
potential for confrontation, due to the TRIPs regulations, between the 
innovating (and patenting) countries and largely non-innovating developing 
countries. Some of the latter have been using such devices as compulsory 
licensing and parallel imports to bypass intellectual property restrictions 
affecting the production and importation of pharmaceuticals used to fight the 
AIDS epidemic
10
. More recently, besides trying to generate financial aid for 
the purchase of required medications in the most afflicted countries, the WHO 
and WTO secretariats have advanced the notion of differentiated prices for so-
called "essential" drugs in the developing countries (see, WHO, 2001).  
   
  As far as technology, and the fruits in general of research and 
                          
    
10
 "Parallel imports" involve the import and resale in a country, without 
the consent of the patent holder, of a patented product which was put on the 
market of the exporting country by the patent holder, or, in another 
legitimate manner. "Compulsory licensing" enables a government to license to a 
company, government agency, or other party, the right to use a patent without 
the title holder's consent. In certain circumstances, both "escape" modalities 
are permitted by the WTO TRIPs Agreement. For more details see, Correa, 2000.   
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development, globalization has not made much of a difference, at least so far, 
to the developing countries. Although some of them have attained technological 
capabilities in certain fields, these are: i) limited as far as the sectors, 
ii) generally to be found among the semi-industrialized, or relatively more 
developed among these countries, and, iii) moreover, not the results of recent 
globalization, but rather of long term human capital formation and 




  R&D efforts and results are still overwhelmingly concentrated among the 
industrialized countries. According to UNDP, 1999 (with data from the WIPO and 
UNESCO), in 1993, only 10 of those countries were responsible for 84% of world 
R&D expenditures, obtained 95% of US registered patents in the last 20 years, 
and were paid more than 90% of all cross border royalties and licensing fees. 
As further indication of the extent of concentration in this area, in 1995, 
more than half total world royalties and licensing fees were paid to the 
United States by other industrialized countries, primarily: Japan, the UK, 
France, Germany and The Netherlands
12
. As for the developing countries, of 
those patents granted to them, more than 80% were obtained by non-residents, 
i.e. residents of the industrialized countries.  
 
                          
    
11
 To mind come, for example: the success of Brazil, India, and South 
Africa, in replicating and mass-producing, at low cost, most patented drugs 
required for AIDS treatment; Korea's worldwide preeminence in steel exports; 
Argentina's mastery of nuclear engineering which has led to exports of its 
technology even to industrialized countries; and the success of Embraer, a 
Brazilian company, in the export market for smaller size jet-airplanes.  
    
12
  It has been estimated that about 70% of world royalties and licensing 
fees were paid within TNCs.  
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  The present distribution of research expenditures not only has s hort 
term negative implications for the developing countries in terms of the loss 
of possible static, or direct, benefits (quasi-rents) of potential innovations 
and patents; it is also detrimental for the long term, as it affects the 
potential for development (and income convergence between developed and 
developing countries) due to the loss in non-researching countries of the 




  III. Main "Disconnects" Between Theory and Practice 
  At first glance there seem to be two main potential "disconnects", (i.e. 
causes for discontent), with increased globalization. First, as foreseen by 
Heckscher-Ohlin, in countries which are labor scarce (such as the 
industrialized countries), unskilled labor is bound to be the losing party 
when international trade is on the rise, and also when production is relocated 
abroad to cheaper sources of supply for labor and intermediates. Second, the 
nation state is clearly affected in various ways by the increased power of 
markets. Its abilities to control, regulate and tax, are weakened when it has 
to submit to international competition and outside determined rules of the 
game. Moreover, such rules are increasingly imposed, or made a condition for 
participation in international markets, by international entities without a 
direct political mandate from citizens in the affected countries. 
 
  When the intrusive role of international market forces upon the nation 
state is referred to, is it meant to say that nations feel subjugated because 
                          
    
13
 The gist of this point was suggested by E. Londero.  
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of increased power or penetration by TNCs? Not likely. The peak of the impact 
(at least on public opinion) of TNCs was probably in the 1960s and early 
1970s, when concerns of the developing countries led to the creation of a 
United Nations Centre for the Study of Transnational Corporations (its 
functions now absorbed by UNCTAD), while Europeans complained about a gap in 
technology and private investment, vis a vis US larger enterprises. Europeans 
may still complain presently about a "venture capital" gap, but investments by 
such enterprises are by and large now considered to be the most beneficial 
form of capital inflows. Moreover, the presence of multinational corporations 
in world markets is not presently restricted to those of one nation. Indeed, 
some of the largest are now European or Asian, and even some developing 
countries sport their own TNCs.  
 
  Does the reference then apply to international lending organizations? 
Although they may try to intervene more than ever before to assist  in the 
handling of individual country economic problems, the trend seems to be 
against an increase in their power. The World Bank and the IMF are both 
suffering from serious image and political problems. First, as a result of 
their loss in relative importance vis a vis private flows of capital, and 
second due to their perceived ineffectiveness in attaining the objectives that 
they have recently adopted for themselves. The former in trying to eradicate 




                          
    
14
 It should be mentioned, that the IMF has recently also succumbed to 
the temptation to add the eradication of poverty in developing countries to 
its macroeconomic policy advisory role (Fisher, 2001).   
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  As to the World Trade Organization (WTO), while it enjoys much  more 
enforcement power than its antecessor, the GATT, as shown by various findings 
against the EU and the USA, the main trading groups can still ignore its 
judgments with relative impunity. Also, most trade rules are initially relaxed 
for a considerable amount of time before being fully applied to the poorer 
developing countries. Moreover, the organization recognizes that "significant 
trade barriers remain, including in areas of particular interest to developing 
countries such as agriculture, and textiles"( WTO, Press Release 222). 
 
  It must also be noted that in the last decades substantial conflicts of 
"sub-national" or "intra-national" power have erupted, in the form of ethnic 
and religious strife, leading to serious attempts at redoing national 
boundaries. Moreover, in more than one case, international interventions have 
avoided, or mitigated, the most deleterious effects of such nation state 
threatening internal developments. 
 
  The positive role of international public opinion and international law 
in curbing the excesses of ethnic conflicts and human rights violations, by 
supporting cross border interventions, must be recognized. Although such 
interventions definitely represent intrusions on national sovereignty, a 
majority would probably consider them a step in the direction of greater 
justice and fairness
15
. Clearly, advocates of "national sovereignty" at all 
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 The experience of countries passing from authoritarian to more 
democratic political regimes in framing a judicial response to the dilemma 
between punishment for past crimes, and reconciliation to attain political 
stability, is articulated in Teitel, R., 2000.   
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costs, may have a hard time defending their positions when benevolent judicial 
intervention across borders results, for example, in the indictment or 
imprisonment of such abject violators of human rights as Pinochet or 
Milosevic.    
 
  But, as stated before, we must concentrate on the economic sphere where, 
as the evidence has shown, substantial changes, particularly in the 
international trade and international finance fields, have taken place. 
 
A. International Trade 
  Lay people experience perception and comprehension problems when 
confronted with the evaluation of decisions and policies about market 
liberalization and freer international trade. These problems arise, in part, 
from failures by the economics profession, and the specialized (economic and 
financial) media, to explain what is really at stake i n the liberalization 
process. More specifically, what are the theoretical pros and cons, the 
potential winners and losers, and particularly, how to compensate the latter 
(Rodrik, 1997 and 1998). 
 
  Economic theory shows (within the boundaries of specific assumptions) 
that there are net overall welfare gains in achieving free international trade 
and that such gains are large enough to make everybody better off, or, at 
least, not worse off than before liberalization. Thus compensation for those 
injured can be provided out of the total benefits accrued from trade gains. 
However, economists have traditionally been remiss in providing clear 
explanations about the gains and the compensation possibilities to lay  
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audiences, and also not quite forthcoming in suggesting policy measures to 
quickly and fairly compensate losers by means of direct transfer payments and 
specific subsidies for relocation and retraining. 
 
  More recently, with the increased application of game theory to economic 
analysis, and the popularity of strategic considerations in explaining trade 
among advanced countries in certain industries, comparative advantage and the 
net welfare gains that may accrue from specialization under free international 
trade have been overshadowed by considerations about t he ability to shift 
profits by gaining advantages from economies of scale and technical 
innovations. 
 
  It should also be noted, that there is really no such thing as totally 
free international trade. Even after substantial reductions in industrial 
tariffs, quantitative and other restrictions remain in agriculture and labor 
intensive industrial products
16
. Lower level equilibria such as attained via 
formal regional economic integration (examples are NAFTA, the European Common 
Market, and Mercosur in South America), or various other forms of preferential 
trading agreements, (PTAs) while permitted within WTO, may divert trade by 
discriminating against more efficient outside producers. Thus they are far 
from optimal, and may/or may not, be second best in welfare economics theory 
terms. There is no clear, unified theoretical response, (i.e covering all 
possible types of arrangements) to the question whether such arrangements lead 
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 Two clear and critical examples are the EU's protectionist Community 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) to restrict 
textile imports from developing countries.      
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to further multilateral trade liberalization or constitute obstacles in that 




  The economics profession, and the specialized media, have been quite 
ineffectual in informing about the above questions and providing unbiased 
editorial help in clarifying political decisions on key trade related issues. 
A good (actually bad) example of how discussion of free trade issues gets 
distorted in the USA is in the demands by some unions and industry 
representatives, as well as members in Congress, for special environmental 




  As seen by a number of developing countries affected, the inclusion of 
environmental regulations, or an insistence that they comply with their own 
labor standards, make little or no sense, but will result in negatively 
affecting their comparative advantage, which as they argue, and Bhagwati, 
2000, agrees to, is the real reason for the pressure to impose such rules and 
not any idealistic desire to improve the lot of workers in other countries, or 
to clean up their air and water. The posited rationale of achieving a "level 
playing field" is reminiscent of the arguments advanced by those favoring in 
the past the imposition of a "scientific" tariff computed to levy an amount 
high enough to compensate for existing cost differences with imported 
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 See Krueger, 1999 for a review of the issues. Ethier, 1998, sees 
preferential trading agreements (PTAs) as a step in the right direction of 
facilitating further multilateral free trade, while Bhagwati, 1995, is of the 
opposite persuasion.  
    
18
 See Bagwell and Steiger, 2001, for a proposal about how to include 
labor and environmental issues within the framework of WTO trade negotiations.  
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products, denying in this way all potential benefits from comparative 
advantage to the importing country.   
 
  Some of the main disputes within the WTO are among industrialized 
countries that while preaching free trade, fight among themselves, for 
example, because of preferences on banana imports (which neither the EU nor 
the USA produces) granted to support their respective TNCs importing this 
tropical fruit from Africa, Caribbean countries or Central America.  Other 
instances are the use of anti-dumping laws to keep cheaper steel imports from 
such countries as Brazil and Korea, or Canadian lumber, out of the USA. 
 
  The mere mention of this kind of conflicts involving large and highly 
industrialized trade blocks, and countries, as well as the still prevailing 
protection afforded to European farmers by the EU Common Agricultural Policy, 
adds an almost surreal atmosphere to discussions about "free" international 
trade. In other areas of intense confrontation among developing and developed 
countries, such as the universal application of laws governing intellectual 
property rights, significant changes to the adopted regulations might be 
required, for example, to deal with AIDS epidemic situations in developing 
countries, given the ability of local pharmaceutical companies in countries 
such as India, Brazil and South Africa to produce generic versions of 
medicines needed to fight AIDS that cost only a fraction of the patented  
versions
19
.        
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 It is interesting to note that while the confrontation with the major 
pharmaceutical companies about lowering prices for patented AIDS treatment 
drugs was going on, the government of Brazil announced, with large paid ads in 
major USA newspapers, that it was providing, through its national health 
system, free of  charge treatment (including drugs provision) to all AIDS  
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B. International Finance   
  As noted, drastic changes have taken place, if not in the direction, 
certainly in the level and composition of capital flows across countries. The 
relative decline of loans and the recent surge in portfolio investment are 
particularly noteworthy.   
   
  The large literature on FDI has stressed both positive and negative 
aspects of such investments from the point of view of the developing 
countries. FDI generally comes in the form of capital goods, implanted for 
productive or infrastructure activities, which are not mobile by their very 
nature. Thus it  entails investments that are usually long term in nature
20
. 
Moreover, foreign investors in productive plants generally also bring with 
them the technical know-how to operate the equipment, as well as marketing and 
managerial skills which are imparted to the local environment. As shown in 
section IIB2, there have been recent changes in the size and destination of 
FDI flows which tend to be associated with increased globalization of the 
world economy. In particular, some increase in the share of such investments 
going to developing countries, albeit to the relatively more developed among 
them.  
 
                                                                   
patients applying for help. 
    
20
 Acquisitions of existing firms or plants as part of privatization 
programs are of a different type, and may involve, at least initially, just a 
change in ownership. In some cases, the agreements included the assumption of 
existing debts as well as investment programs for future modernization of 
existing facilities.   
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  But it is in portfolio investment that the most important changes have 
taken place (see section IIB2). By their very nature, portfolio investments, 
not necessarily limited to stock shares but also including bonds and other 
debt obligations, are more liquid in nature and with shorter average maturity 
than FDI.  
 
  Wall Street has been marketing stock shares and bonds from developing 
countries with the tantalizing label of "emerging" markets securities. In its 
business section,  The Washington Post now regularly publishes a table with 
data from 12 stock markets, of which six are in developing countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. Although 
measured by capitalization and volume of shares traded these markets are 
minuscule when compared to the major stock markets in the USA, Britain or 
Japan, they nevertheless represent a new phenomenon. In spite of the 
foreseeable surrounding uncertainties, Wall Street has succeeded in convincing 
many investors, ranging from pension funds to private individuals, that a 
well-balanced portfolio should include a share of "emerging" markets stocks 
and bonds.  
          
  The rewards from some of these investment instruments seem to be so high 
as to compensate for the risk, and not even sovereign defaults seem now to 
matter for very long. See Table 17 with recent returns for a number of bonds 
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   Table 17. Returns to Selected Emerging Markets Bond Issues. 2001 
  (percent) 
          Issuing Country              Return 
  Argentina             -52.0 
  Brazil               4.1 
  Ecuador1/              24.2 
  Mexico              12.1 
  Peru              22.2  
  Philippines              19.1 
  Mexico              12.1 
  Russia2/              46.4 
   
  Notes: 1/ Ecuador defaulted on its debt on 1999. 
  2/ Russia defaulted on local bank debt in 1998. 
  Source: International Herald Tribune, November 27, 2001, p.15, quoting  
  J.P. Morgan emerging markets bond index data.   
  Finally, in recent years, following capital accounts liberalization, 
private banks have been quite active in developing countries pushing their 
loans which generate higher returns than in their more traditional markets, 
given existing differences in country risk. But as shown in section IIB2, 
nothing comparable to the levels attained following the oil-shocks. Actually, 
loans is the component of capital flows that has increased the least, having 
in fact shrunk when measured in real terms. Such lending has generally also 
moved out  from markets falling in disfavor. 
 
  Portfolio investment and bank lending are particularly sensible to local 
changes in interest rates and the exchange rate; key variables responsible for 
them coming to these markets in the first place. Thus it is not surprising 
that these flows might be de-stabilizing to countries recently embarked in 
liberalizing their capital account. Sudden outflows may lead to substantial  
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reversals in the flow of capital and there have been a number of such episodes 
affecting developing countries in recent years. As Table 18 below indicates, 
some of these reversals were of quite large magnitude when measured as a 
proportion of GDP. 
 
  Table 18. Selected Reversals in Net Private Capital Flows to Developing 
        Countries. (percent of GDP) 
      Country         Date        Flow Reversal 
  Argentina        1982-83           20.0 
  Argentina        1993-94            4.0 
  Mexico        1981-83           12.0 
  Mexico        1993-95            6.0 
  Thailand        1996-98           26.0  
  Venezuela        1992-94            9.0 
    Source: Reinhart, 1999, Table 1.     
   
  Unrestricted capital mobility, coupled with the use of political 
pressure at the national and international level, to enforce it
21
, has been 
blamed as a major culprit of the financial crises of recent years
22
. 











                          
    
21
 Bhagwati even refers to a purported IMF-USA Treasury conspiracy to 
press for capital account convertibility to satisfy Wall Street lobbying. See, 
Bhagwati, 2000. 
    
22
 Among others by Eatwell and Taylor, 2000, and Mishkin, 1999.    
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  Table 19. Major World Financial Crises in 1980s and 1990s 
           Origin               Date 
 Latin America, Southern Cone            1979-81 
 Debt crisis, devel. countries            1982 
 Mexico            1994-95 
 East Asia            1997-98 
 Russia            1998 
 Brazil            1999 
 Europe (ERM)            1992 
 
  Source: Eatwell and Taylor, p.5 
 
  In judging the stability of the new financial order, i.e. with 
unrestricted capital mobility, it is worth noticing the number of major 
financial crises, originating in developing as well as advanced countries, 
recently experienced by the system. See Table 19.  
   
  Obtsfeld, 1998 argues that excessive reliance on non-equity flows was 
really responsible. Rogoff, 1999, shares this view
23
. Mishkin, 1999, 
attributes the volatility to problems of adverse selection arising as a result 
of the existence of asymmetric information between borrower and lender, and 
moral hazard due to the presumption by lenders that their loans are in fact 
insured by the governments of their borrowers
24
.   
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 It should be noted, that due to its relative liquidity, portfolio 
investment, which constitutes equity investment, m ay also exhibit volatile 
behavior and thus become a contributing factor to financial crises.  
    
24
 The implicit guarantors could also be lenders of last resort 
supporting the government, such as the IMF acting with its own resources, or 
in cases where larger sums are involved, with the cooperation of the G-7 group 
of industrialized countries.   
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  In examining the evidence on the direction of capital flows, Obtsfeld, 
1998, notes that a large majority of capital flows take place among the main 
industrialized countries, and as concerns developing countries, some 10 of the 
relatively better off countries in Latin America and Asia, absorb the vast 
majority of the flows not going to developed economies. Since economic theory 
predicts that capital should flow to where it is scarcer relative to labor, 
which would imply the poorer developing countries, Lucas, 1990, raised the 
obvious question about what explains the  above paradoxical results, i.e. 
capital not really flowing to places where it would command the highest 
returns. The answer is not surprising: capital, as any factor of production, 
only provides high productivity returns when it operates with the necessary 
complement of other factors. Capital continues flowing largely to highly 
developed environments (USA, Japan, Europe), because there it encounters the 
skills, infrastructure, and institutional arrangements that complement its 
contribution. 
 
  As mentioned,  capital flows are not homogeneous and the absorption of 
the various kinds available, FDI, portfolio investment, and loans, has 
different implications for economic growth and macroeconomic policy. While as 
noted above, FDI tends to stay much longer due to the inherent restrictions in 
mobility of capital equipment ("machines are bolted" as the saying goes), 
portfolio investment and loans may remain only for the short-run due to 
considerations about interest rates and exchange rates which may change 
rapidly and lead to considerable volatility. 
 
  Also, following up on the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model, macroeconomic  
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analysts have noted the policy dilemma that characterizes economies with 
fixed, or strongly pegged, rates of exchange, when opened to unrestricted 
capital flows. These countries loose the ability to use domestic monetary 
policy to alleviate declines in output and employment. This has been called 
the "open economy trilemma", i.e. the choices forced upon the economy when the 
flexibility of one basic price, such as the rate of exchange, is lost. Quoting 
Obstfeld, 1998, pp. 14-15: 
 
"... A country cannot simultaneously maintain fixed 
exchange rates and an open capital market while 
pursuing monetary policy oriented toward domestic 
goals. Governments may choose only two of the above. 
If monetary policy is geared toward domestic consider- 
ations, either capital mobility or the exchange rate 
must go. If fixed exchange rates and integration into 
the global capital market are the primary desiderata, 
monetary policy must be subjugated to those ends." 
 
 
  It is to be further noticed, that while all industrially advanced 
countries since the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s 
tend to have flexible exchange rates, developing countries are often advised 
to keep theirs fixed, or pegged to a stronger currency. With capital mobility 
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 Although Argentina's policy choices were mostly self-inflicted, the 
country exemplifies the latter case considered by Obstfeld. Its recent 
governments value highly the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate and 
integration into the global capital market and consequently cannot use 
monetary policy for domestic purposes. They could use fiscal policy instead, 
in theory, to reactivate the economy which is in a deep recession due to a 
severely overvalued domestic currency, but following IMF's requirements to 
continue its financial support, it is perversely cutting government expenses 
and increasing taxes to lower the fiscal deficit, i.e. for adjustment, and not 
for reactivation purposes.      
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  In a provocative study, Rodrik, 1997, tries to show with the use of time 
series and cross section data that government transfer payments provide a 
social cushion to the risk arising from increased exposure to international 
trade. He sustains that more open economies have larger government 
expenditures in part to compensate for the added risk due to openness. With 
increased openness to capital it becomes difficult to tax capital and the tax 
burden shifts from capital to labor. The increased risk due to capital 
mobility represents a negative externality on immobile factors. He claims that 
his empirical results support the following propositions: a) globalization 
reduces the government's ability to spend resources in social programs, b) 
open capital markets make it more difficult to tax capital, and c) labor then 
carries a growing share of the tax burden.  
 
  If proven valid, these results bring out a tension between the need for 
increased adjustment assistance and social insurance expenditures to make 
further globalization politically acceptable, and counteracting fiscal 
constraints that seem to be intrinsic to the  globalization process itself. 
Unless, as suggested by Bhagwati (1998), we were to distinguish between the 
liberalization of trade and that of the capital account, and to adopt a more 
circumspect attitude vis a vis the timing and composition of capital 
liberalization.         
   
  IV. What Should be Done? 
  Selected policies and other measures that could be taken to improve the 
situation exposed, particularly as it refers to international trade and 
international finance, are presented below.  
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A. International Trade 
  Prospects for trade liberalization have improved recently with the 
agreement reached at the WTO Doha (Qatar) recent meeting about launching a new 
round of trade negotiations. Specially, because of the acceptance by the EU to 
discuss its agricultural policy with a view to a reduction in their subsidies, 
and by the USA to put its anti-dumping rules on the negotiating table. Also 
potentially advantageous for the developing countries are the prospects of 
further liberalization in the markets of textiles and other labor intensive 
products.  
 
  The USA is a key player in these negotiations and there is some concern 
about whether the executive branch will receive authorization by Congress, to 
negotiate trade agreements without having them to be approved in detail by 
Congress which would then only have the chance to vote yes or no on the total 
agreement reached. This is the so-called Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 
previously known as "fast track authority". Its granting is very important 
because major negotiating parties, such as the EU for example, will be very 
reluctant to make concessions to USA executive branch representatives as part 
of agreements that could then be nullified by a vote of Congress.   
 
  The areas of contention that remain include, in addition to the above, 
the insistence on tying environmental regulations and labor standards to the 
negotiations of trade agreements within the WTO. Those do not belong in there 
and can be discussed in other multilateral fora
26
.  
                          
    
26
 There is a United Nations Environment Program to handle environmental  
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  The need to adequately compensate "losers" of trade liberalization needs 
to be considered at all pertinent levels: individual workers, affected 
industries, and distressed localities. The gains from trade accruing to 
consumers plus the more efficient allocation of resources accruing to 
producers and the economy, should be used in part, to deal also with the 
impact of "dying" industries and the disappearance of skill or industry-
specific jobs. 
 
  When as a result of tariff reduction negotiations, jobs are lost, for 
example in apparel (a labor intensive sector in which other, mostly 
developing, countries have the comparative advantage), the fact that new jobs 
will be  created in the aircraft industry (in which the US has a strong 
comparative advantage) is of little help. Most of the aircraft industry is 
located on the West Coast of the US, while most of the apparel industry is on 
the East Cost. There are clear obstacles to the geographic and occupational 
mobility of labor. Jobs differ in their skill content and even when workers 
have the new required skills they can often not move from job to job without 
also moving from place to place. Moving is expensive, and workers may lose 
seniority and other benefits. Most workers want to stay where they are and not 
to be uprooted from family, neighbors and friends
27
.  
                                                                   
problems. Moreover, specific issues affecting the environment have been dealt 
already in a multilateral context and resulted in international pacts such as 
the Kyoto and Montreal agreements. The International Labor Organization (ILO), 
which has a tripartite governing body (labor, business, and government), could 
deal with arising labor questions. Fortunately, in the Doha agreement about 
new trade negotiations  the USA representative did not press to include the 
labor standards issue in the agenda. 
    
27
 Taken from, Kenen, 1985, p. 246.  
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  Thus to gain workers's support for continued trade liberalization in 
industrially advanced countries, adjustment assistance, in the form of 
benefits for unemployment resulting from trade liberalization, relocation 
subsidies and loans, retraining and training expenses, should be made 
available, to affected workers
28
. Special programs to develop new sources of 
employment should be devised in cooperation with localities affected by the 
closure of important employers's facilities. Finally, affected  industries 
should be helped to close up or to transition to different activities with the 
help of loans or subsidies made conditional on the carrying out of employment-




  In matters pertaining to intellectual property rights, further 
relaxation of the rules as they affect developing countries should be 
attained, similarly as with the recent agreement about patents in areas 
affecting public health.    
 
B. International Finance 
   The situation is not so clear in the area of international finance. Of 
course it could be said, that free international finance leads to benefits 
                          
    
28
 The US had a Trade Adjustment Assistance program during the 1960s and 
1970s, up to the early 1980s. It was good at paying  additional unemployment 
benefits but deficient in providing retraining and relocation assistance, or 
in helping to find new jobs. (See Kenen, 1985, pp. 245-48).  
    
29
 Economists have been remiss in undertaking the design of such policy 
measures but should be encouraged to change this attitude. A. Dixit, put it in 
the following way: "Designing more efficient systems of social insurance, 
tailored to the particular shocks that matter to particular countries, which 
will allow them to secure more of the benefits of integration and suffer less 
of the social costs of it, is just the right kind of task for economists." 
Quoted in Rodrik, 1997, p.73.  
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similar to those shown to accrue as a result of free international trade. 
(see, for example, Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994, p. 635). But as argued by 
Bhagwati (1998), and others, trade in goods is not the same as trade in money 
or on financial assets 
30
. Moreover, since capital liberalization in a world 
economy with mostly flexible exchange rates, is historically a phenomenon only 
of the last 25 years, and for many countries even more recent
31
, new problems 
arise with no real parallel in the past.   
 
  Also, there is as yet no conceptual agreement as to the diagnosis of the 
problems being confronted, and, consequently, about possible remedies. We have 
witnessed volatility in short term capital flows, and periodic country crises 
that by contagion threaten de stability of the world financial system. Some 
blame asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers leading to problems 
of adverse selection. Moral hazard also arises from implicit government 
guarantees of country debt which lead to overextending in the lending and/or 
the incurring of excessive risk. For others, it is all a question of the 
composition of the borrowing and to attain an adequate mix by rising the 
proportion of equity investment. Still others would like to also alter the 
composition of capital inflows by restricting short term movements of capital 
that add to volatility, and various forms of control and taxation have been 
                          
    
30
 Bhagwati goes so far as to imply that there is good and bad 
globalization. Trade belongs in the beneficial category, while unrestricted 
capital mobility may have deleterious effects and should not be advocated 
across the board. 
    
31
 Canada, Germany and Switzerland eliminated all restrictions on capital 
movements in 1973, the USA in 1974, the UK in 1979, Japan in 1980, France and 
Italy in 1990, and Spain and Portugal in 1992. (Eatwell and Taylor, p.3). 
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proposed for that purpose
32
. 
  In assessing the merits and problems created by capital controls, 
Cooper, 1999, depending on exchange rate regime, and other country conditions, 
does not rule them out, specially for short term inflows. In reviewing the 
Chilean experience with capital inflow controls, Edwards, 1999, reaches a less 
than enthusiastic conclusion about their long term viability and 
effectiveness, advocating instead to avoid financial instability, to 
liberalize the capital account only gradually, to adopt a not too rigid 
exchange rate regime, and to implement strong supervision of the domestic 
banking system. 
 
  Other students of the problem have proposed more drastic solutions that 
would affect the so-called "architecture" of the international financial 
system.  
   
  Rogoff, 1999, reviews a number of these proposals but does not really 
favor any major institutional changes. In Table 20 below, we list some of the 






                          
    
32
 Chile imposed a tax for short term investments, and Tobin had proposed 
long ago a small tax on all international financial transactions which some 
activists have recently brought back to the forefront for international 
consideration.   
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  Table 20. Proposed Changes to International Financial Architecture 
            Proposal                      Proponent 
 Intern. Dep. Insur. Corp.        Soros, 1998 
 Int. Bankruptcy Court      Sachs, 1995   
 Controls on capital outflows      Krugman, 1998 
 Controls on capital inflows      Eichengreen, 1999 
 Glob. Reg. Fin. Mkts. And Inst.      Kaufman, 1998  
 World Financial Authority      Eatwell and Taylor, 2000 
 World Central Bank      Garten, 1998 
 Lender of Last Resort      Fischer, 1999 
  
  Source: Rogoff, 1999, p. 21, and author's information.   
   
  The Soros proposal for an international deposit insurance corporation 
draws on the parallel with national USA experience that provides for 
government guarantee of bank deposits up to 100,000 dollars per account. It 
contributes to reduce the risk inherent in a banking system that issues very 
liquid short-term liabilities, that depositors may choose to all withdraw 
simultaneously, while holding its assets in the form of illiquid longer term 
loans. If the analogy with country or sovereign debt were to hold, it is 
argued that a lender of last resort, such as the government in the domestic 
context, could also stop country debt runs or panics. Thus the Soros proposal 
and the Fischer proposal (to make the IMF the international lender of last 
resort) have much in common.  
 
  What are the problems? The key one present in any attempt at insuring  
against such risks, is moral hazard. Once it knows that the government is 
backing its operations with its guarantee, the bank in case will tend to have  
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a riskier portfolio than it would otherwise do. In principle, the adverse 
effects of moral hazard can be diminished with minimum capital requirements, 
bank supervision, and other administrative means, although in many developing 
countries such regulation is badly missing.  
   
  Given the l ack of an appropriate legal and institutional international 
framework, Rogoff, 1999, dismisses most "grand plans" and suggests instead 
focusing on modest improvements such as greater transactions transparency and 
regulation of banks in the developing countries. He concedes that with a 
longer horizon, global capital market integration will lead to enhanced 
regional and global political institutions, at which point, proposals such as 
the global bankruptcy court
33
, or an integrated system of financial regulation 
might stand better chances of implementation.  
 
  His main critique of all the plans about changes in the international 
financial system is that they focus too much on the results of having placed 
excessive reliance on debt finance and bank intermediation, rather than trying 
to offer similar opportunities for equity financing. Thus a better balance 
between debt and equity would improve risk-sharing and reduce the impact of 





                          
    
33
 According to recent reports, A. Krueger, in the IMF, and Mr. O'Neill, 
the USA Secretary of the Treasury, have expressed interest in the proposal.   
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